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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
I-lOW ARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD~ MOTION AND 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, BRIEF FOR 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, REHEARING 
vs. 
MILDRED M. HOWARD and WALKER 
BANK & TRUST CO., as Administrator 
of the Estate of L. W. Howard, Deceased. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9223 
Appellants respectfully move the court for a rehearing 
of the above entitled matter. In doing so, counsel for Ap-
pellants is compelled not only by a desire to see that justice 
is done to his clients, but also and primarily counsel is greatly 
concerned about the violence done to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the holding of the court in the above case. 
Appellants can readily proceed in the matter and are con-
vinced they will eventually prevail. But the damage to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure will be permanent. The court, 
by this decision, gives its blessing to sloppy practices, sactions 
failure to read the rules or follow the suggested forms. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
If the effect of the decision of the court were confined 
to this case, the result would not be so serious, but this case 
will become precedent and counsel would like to point out 
some of the dangers that can flow from it. 
SANCTIONING F AlLURE TO FOLLOW FORM 20 MAKES 
FOLLOWING OF OTHER FORMS UNNECESSARY AND 
OPENS DOOR TO ABUSE OF PROCESS. 
Form 20 outlines the form of the motion. The court 
by this decision decrees that this form need not be followed. 
Any wording will suffice as long as the intent may be 
gleaned from any portion of the instrument. Form l is a 
summons. There is nothing in the rules which gives greater 
sanctity to Form l than to Form 20. Suppose we apply to 
Form l the same liberality that the court is approving as to 
Form 20. We would have a document somewhat as follows: 
"A B (Plaintiff) 
vs. 
"D B (Defendant) 
NOTICE OF INTENTION 
TO ISSUE SUMMONS 
Civil No. _____ _ 
"You and each of you will please take notice 
that the plaintiff A B intends to issue summons against 
the defendant B D, etc. 
"This summons is to obtain judgment on an open 
account for merchandise in the sun1 of $ ____ _ 
"Dated 19 ___ _ 
Attorney for Plaintiff" 
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Does the court, for a moment, believe that such docu-
ment would be sufficient to support a default judgment? The 
members of the court are probably aware of the fact that 
collection agencies often use forms similar to a summons 
to frighten debtors into paying. Suppose a document simi-
lar to the one quoted above were served on a debtor and 
he ignored it, and a complaint was filed and default judg-
ment entered. Could not the attorney for the plaintiff, using 
such an instrument, cite as authority for the validity of the 
alleged summons the precedent of this case? He would be 
fully justified in pointing out that if the words: "Said 
n1otion with respect to the cause mentioned" constitutes 
sufficient compliance with Form 20, then the words "this 
summons is to obtain judgment" would be sufficient to 
comply with Form l. 
In order to extend mercy and leniency to a careless 
defendant, must the court subject the bar and the public to 
the grave dangers that may result if no semblance of com-
pliance with the forms is required? The respondent, in 
serving the document which the court approves, did so either 
(a) to deceive, or (b) because counsel was too lazy or too 
cocksure of his position to open his code and follow the 
form therein plainly outlined. The court should not put it~ 
stamp of approval on either (a) nor (b). Equity rewards 
the diligent, not the slothful. 
The court has said: 
"Although the New Rules of Civil Procedure were 
intended to provide liberality in procedure, it is never-
theless expected that they will be followed, and, 
unless reasons satisfactory to the court are advanced 
as a basis for relief from complying with them, 
parties will not be excused from so doing." Holton 
v. Holton, 243 P 2 438. 
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Again, counsel reiterates, by way of emphasis,, if Form 
20 may be completely ignored, then Form 1 or Form 28, 29, 
31, 32 or 33 may likewise be ignored and the way is 
opened for trickery and abuse of process and careless, dis-
orderly procedure. 
BEST RULE OF LAW IS TO REQUIRE NOTICE AND 
MOTION TO BE SERVED TOGETHER. 
To hold that the notice of hearing is not an integral part 
of the motion, defeats the clear purpose of Rule 6 (d). This 
rule is an amendment of the former Code Section 104-42-3. 
Section 104-42-3 did not require the service of motion and 
notice of hearing together. This led to abuses, and to 
cure this, subparagraph (d) was added to tie the two 
together; and, in order that there might be no mistake about it, 
Form 20 set it forth in detail. Then, to provide greater 
liberality, the compiler's added: 
"The motion and notice above may be combined and 
denominated a Notice of Motion under Rule 7 (b) ; 
or, it may be made separately, either as above indi-
cated or on two pages under separate title of the 
d " court an cause. 
Surely this gives great leeway In form. But the intent of 
the compilers of the Code was still that the motion and the 
notice be served together. 
Before the court determines that the motion and the 
notice need not he served together, as the wording of Rule 6 
(d) and the statements of the commentators of the similar 
Federal Rule indicate, or at least imply, should not careful 
consideration be given to the question as to which is the 
better law? Does it not tend toward more expeditious and 
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orderly law to require the service of motion and notice 
together, than to revert to the practice under the old rule of 
104-42-3? 
ELIMINATION OF RULE REQUIRING PARTICULARI-
ZATION IN MOTION WILL BE HARMFUL TO COURTS 
AND IS CONTRARY TO ADJUDICATED CASES. 
The decision of the court that only such particularization 
in a motion is required sufficient to advise of the theories 
upon which a new trial was sought, runs directly contrary to 
the adjudicated cases, both of our own court and of other 
jurisdictions as well. What is particularity, and why is it 
required? It is more than a mere assertion of the theory 
relied upon. The decision that particularization is not neces-
sary repeals rule 7 (b) ( 1), and all cases which require the 
particulars to be set forth, including: In re Application 7600 
to appropriate water, 73 Utah 50, 58, 272 P 255; Townsend 
v. Holbrook 89 Utah 147, 56 P 2 610; and Sharp v. Bowen 
87 Utah 327, 48 P 2 905. Appellants point out that there 
is no particularization whatsoever as to ground one, of the 
so-called "Motion", and the only particularization as to 
ground two, is contained in the affidavit and what particu-
larization there is there does not in the least respect support 
any allegation of an irregularity in the proceeding of the 
court. These irregularities are annotated on page 651 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Volume 9; and, merely because 
the court ruled against the defendant, does not constitute 
irregularity. For the court to approve an affidavit which 
does not show irregularity, is again an approval of laxity 
and carelessness and nullifies the clear meaning of rule 7 
(b) ( 1). This requirement is one designed to aid the courts 
and should not be lightly brushed aside. This matter might 
be discussed at considerable length, but because counsel 
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regards the threat to orderly procedure already hereinabove 
referred to to be a far greater danger to the Bar and the 
public, this point as to particularity will not be further 
argued. 
RULING THAT ABANDONMENT CANNOT EXIST IF 
EITHER PARTY MAY CALL UP IS REVERSAL OF 
ESTABLISHED LAW. 
One final point appellants must mention. The court 
concludes that there was no abandonment of respondent's 
"Motion" because appellants could have called it up at any 
time. This holding nullifies the entire doctrine of dismissal 
for failure to diligently prosecute. It has heretofore been 
settled law that if a litigant did not press his claim diligently, 
his right to do so would die. The courts have heretofore had 
inherent power to dismiss a complaint for failure to prose-
cute. Is this right to dismissal now to be denied because the 
adverse party could have called the matter up for hearing 
at any time? It is the duty of the moving party to show 
diligence. There are no cases where the adverse party could 
not go forward. Must he do so when that is not his duty? 
Having this right, hut not the duty, is he to be denied the 
right to a dismissal for lack of prosecution? If this he so, 
then the whole doctrine of diligence ceases to be a principle 
of law. 
The decision of the court in this case must be regarded 
as overruling the case of Darke v. Ireland, 4 Utah 192, ( 196). 
There, too, both parties had the right to call up the motion, 
but where the moving party did not do so for 13 months, 
the court held that to constitute abandonment. It is respect-
fully submitted that if the court should reconsider this point 
~l nd uphold an.d folio'"' l he Darke case, then the destruction to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
the Rules of Civil Procedure required to rule in favor of the 
respondent, need not occur. 
The committee that formulated the Rules of Civil 
Procedure worked long and hard. They went just as far as 
was considered safe in providing liberality in procedure, to 
free the Bar from the strictness of the old code. Now the 
court, for no justifiable reason, because the respondent 
made no effort to show justification for failure to read or 
follow the forms, bruskly shuffles aside even these mild 
restrictions of form and indicates that any writing which 
"advise( s) of the theories" is sufficient. Is it advisable, 
in order to extend mercy and leniency, to a negligent mem-
ber of the Bar, to place in jeopardy the public and the mem-
bers of the Bar, by indicating that attorneys may, with im-
punity, disregard all rules and forms, as long as they say 
enough that someone may be able to surmise their intent? 
This case, if permitted to stand, will be precedent for all 
manner of laxity in civil procedure, if it does not open wide 
the gate to trickery and deceit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
1414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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